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Diyanet’s Role in Building the ’Yeni
(New) Milli’ in the AKP Era
Nil Mutluer
Since the foundation of  the Republic  of  Turkey,  the Presidency of  Religious Affairs  [
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, hereinafter Diyanet] is the only legally established state institution
that regulates Sunni-Muslim religious affairs and serves the citizens who profess that
faith.  Therefore,  examining Diyanet sheds light  on the changing relations of  religion,
politics,  state,  and society,  and the  values  attributed to  the  secular  –  laik  –  and the
national in Turkey. The aim of this study is to examine the continuities and novelties that
Diyanet, as an institution which has assumed a major function since its foundation in
creating the national religion of the Turkish Republic, namely the secular – laik – Muslim
Turkish national identity, underwent in the neoliberal AKP [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,
Justice and Development Party] period. 
Discussions on the modern relations as  well  as  the tensions between secularism and
religion have been directly linked with theories on the formation of modernity and of the
European nation-states and nationalisms. Such theories regard socioeconomic (Gellner
1983), cultural (Anderson 1991) and/or political modernity (Breuilly 1994; Tilly 1996) as
the  basis  of  the  modern  nation-state.  With  their  secularist  bias  such  theories
underestimate the significant role religion plays at social and political levels and consign
religion to the domain of the private. 
Secularization processes differentiate various spheres of human activity,  including, in
particular, economy, society and polity from religious institutions and norms (Casanova
1994).  This  process  not  only  shapes  the meanings  attributed to  the secular,  and the
religious, as well as to the national and nationalism in a power hierarchy, but it also has
an  impact  on  individuals’  as  well  as  socio-political  actors’  identification  with  these
concepts (Jenkins 2004). Euro-centric narratives position the secular-religious divide in
binaries  (Asad 2003)  where  the  secular  is  identified with “hegemonic  conceptions  of
progress” (Butler 2008), such as freedom and being modern or liberal, and the religious is
identified with backwardness (Asad 2003; Dhawan 2013). And as Brubaker argues there is
an intertwined relationship between religion and nationalism:
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Nationalist  politics  can  accommodate  the  claims  of  religion,  and  nationalist
rhetoric  often  deploys  religious  language,  imagery  and  symbolism.  Similarly,
religion can accommodate the claims of the nation-state, and religious movements
can deploy nationalist language (2012: 16)
This  intertwined  relationship  notwithstanding,  however,  at  the  symbolic  level,  the
“fundamental ontologies and structures of justification” of nationalism and religion differ
from  one  another  (Brubaker  2012:  17)  and  this  also  shapes  the  way  secularism  is
understood and practiced.
The Turkish state’s approach to faith and religion has been shaped in relation to the
Ottoman  period  (Gözaydın  2014).  Even  though  there  are  different  arguments  about
whether the relations between religious and state affairs have been managed separately
(İnalcık 1973, Mardin 1998) or together (Akgündüz 2002; Başgil [1942] 2007; Kara 2008), it
is safe to say that in the last period of the Ottoman state and during the foundation era of
the  Republic,  religion  was  controlled  by  the  state  (Yavuz  2009).  In  the  nation-state
building  process,  the  founding Kemalist  elites  of  the  early  republican era  adopted a
unifying  approach  centred  around  the  Muslim  and  Turkish  citizens.  In  the  early
Republican era religion was still  an effective force,  and therefore,  in the nation-state
building process, Kemalist elites sought to control religion’s role in politics through a
myriad  of  legislations  and  state  institutions,  while  introducing  national  truths  as
substitutes for religious ones (Gülalp 2017: 49). Ethnic identities other than the Turkish
have been disregarded. As a result of the ban on such religious institutions as medreses, 
tekkes and  zaviye s  during  the  early  republican  era,  Diyanet has  been  the  dominant
reference institution within the Islamic faith for more than 90 years (Gözaydın 2009).
Moreover, since the problem of freedom of conscience in Turkey has been dealt with
almost exclusively on the basis of the restrictions brought on Sunni-Islam institutions
and  practices,  both  the  non-Sunni  Islamic  communities,  and  religious  communities
professing  other  faiths,  as  well  as  non-believers  have  been  marginalized  and
discriminated (Bora [2002] 2003; Akgönül 2011).
In the foundation era of the Republic, arguing that it is against “modernity”, Kemalist
elites sought to restrict religious-political activities, by positioning all Islamic practices
that  fall  outside the framework set  by the State,  as  reactionary.  They presented the
principle of secularism as an ideological imposition designed to protect the state against
both  reactionary  and  anti-Turkish  currents  (İnsel  2001;  Çelik  2001).  Accordingly,
secularism or laiklik as  it  was referred to by the Kemalist  founders of  the state,  was
positioned,  from  the  very  beginning,  not  as  something  that  protects  democratic
freedoms, but as something that protects the secular, Turkish, Muslim identity (Ünder
2001; Kara 2004; Öztürk 2016). Therefore concepts such as secularism, secular-Turkish
and democracy have been positioned, from the very beginning, as rival approaches which
seek to restrict each other’s respective spheres of influence (Mutluer 2016a; Gülalp 2017).
As a result,  those who identify themselves with secularism or democracy have found
themselves positioned as each other’s other. 
How Diyanet is positioned in this divide between secularism and democracy has always
been open to interpretation by different factions and governments.  The political  and
sociological balances in the relations of power have become the primary determinants of
Diyanet’s  social  and  political  activities.  In  line  with  the  changes  in  the  political
conjuncture, Diyanet’s budget, activities and service areas have been restricted in some
periods and expanded in others.
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While those who stand for democracy and freedom of conscience against the centralist
secular approach advocated for the abolishment of Diyanet, those who advocated for the
central-statist approach saw Diyanet as a bulwark of secularism (Gözaydın 2008). 
When the AKP came to power in 2002, it positioned itself as a “conservative democratic”
political party (Akdoğan 2004). The 2002 Party Program described AKP as follows:
AK PARTI seeks to make dominant an understanding of politics which looks for
change in continuity, protects differences within unity, trusts in the dynamism of
the society and is open to the developments and novelties in the world. As such, it
is a democratic, conservative, innovative and modern party (AKP 2002).1 
As  such,  AKP  positioned  itself,  not only  as  a  representative  of  the  grassroots
conservatives’ aspirations to emancipate religion, but also as an active contender in the
current  political  dynamics  centred  around  such  concepts  as  innovativeness  and
modernity.  In  the  founding  congress  of  AKP,  Erdoğan  sought  to  bridge  the  secular-
democrat divide by stating that his party was advocating for a secular state based on the
rule of law. In the speech he made, Erdoğan said that “we see secularism as guarantee for
democracy and as the basic principle for social peace” (Akdoğan 2004: 629).2 
Yet after the electoral victory of 2011 with 49.83% of the votes, AKP started to recede
from its original promise of hitting a balance between secularism and democracy. Under
the umbrella discourse of  democratization,  the AKP has applied a hegemonic project
based on neoliberal,  conservative and authoritarian premises (Akça 2014). In order to
succeed in implementing this project it  had to redistribute the roles in the relations
between family, society, the market and the state (Öztan 2014) and as a modern national
“hegemonic” (Öztürk 2016) state institution, Diyanet was a convenient tool, which could
be used to instil the new religious and national values. 
AKP’s position on Diyanet’s existence has changed over time. In 2002 when the AKP came
to power, the party officials saw Diyanet as an institution against freedom of conscience
and as  such  they  were  highly  critical  of  its  existence.  After  2010,  however,  Diyanet
experienced its  most  powerful  period in terms of  both its  budget  and socio-political
activities, under the AKP governments. I argue that in the AKP period Diyanet has become
one  of  the  major  institutions  of  the  Turkish  state  not  only  carrying  the  new
understanding of religion as well as the ‘the national’ to the different segments of Turkish
society, but also reshaping the relations between state actors, society, family and market
according to conservative neoliberal authoritarian needs.
This  study  focuses  on  how Diyanet  has  become one  of  the  most  important  political
symbols and representatives of  the “yeni  milli” (new national)  – or to use AKP’s own
terminology  “yerli  ve  milli”  (homegrown  and  national)  –  values  and  authoritarian,
neoliberal  policies  that  the AKP seeks  to instil  and implement.  By adopting feminist
discourse analysis (with a reflexive approach) this study first discusses the institutional
structure  of  Diyanet  during  the  AKP  era,  and  then  analyses  the  policies  and  public
statements of Diyanet, government and non-governmental actors in the following issue
areas:  Diyanet’s presidents during the AKP era,  nationalism-militarism, Kurdish,  Alevi
and  gender  questions.  The  data  of  this  study  is  based  on  archival,  media  and
ethnographical  research  on  structural,  social  and political  economic  dimensions  of
Diyanet carried out between 2012 and 2014 (Mutluer 2014) as well as on discourse analysis
of archival and media material of and about DIB’s activities since 2014. 
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The Institutional Structure of Diyanet: From
Republican to AKP Eras
Diyanet was established on 3 March 1924, to replace the Ottoman Ministry of Religious
Affairs and Foundations. In the same period, religious institutions such as tekkes, zaviyes, 
medreses and dergahs were banned with statute no 677, known as tekkes and zaviyes statute,
passed  in  1925.  In  1931  the  scope  of  Diyanet’s  activities  were  narrowed  down  to
regulating the texts of religious sermons. This move undermined Diyanet’s effectiveness
and relegated it to a more passive role (Gözaydın 2009). Diyanet was given its first organic
law eleven years after its foundation, in 1935. Up to that point Diyanet owed its legal
status to budgetary bills and had no other legal basis which determined its organizational
structure (Mertcan 2013). Diyanet received its current organizational structure and scope
with statute no 633, of 1965. In addition to restructuring Diyanet headquarters and field
office, that statute, which is still in force, introduced moral education of the society as
one of the areas of Diyanet responsibility (RG-2/7/1965-12038). 
In the post-1980 Coup period, there was not much change in Diyanet’s position and its
mission to enlighten people on religious matters continued as before. The 1982
Constitution  mentioned  Diyanet  in  article  136,  which  charged  it  with  the  task  of
“remaining over and above all political views and thoughts and performing its legally
assigned duties under the guidance of the principle of secularism and adopting national
solidarity  and  integration  as  its  sole  purpose.”  After  the  28  February  1997  military
intervention, however, the scope of its activities was narrowed down, and its budget3 was
reduced considerably.
With the coming of AKP to power in 2002, the position of Diyanet as an institution was
strengthened once again, and many improvements have been made to its budget, staffing
and  employment  conditions.  There  have  been  continuous  increases  in  the  Diyanet’s
budget  since the very first  days  of  AKP governments.  Yet  these increases  cannot  be
judged as excessive as they can be seen as compensating for the cuts during the February
28th military intervention era. But in 2010 there was a hike in the increase of Diyanet’s
budget.4 The same year,  Diyanet  status in the hierarchy of  the public  administrative
machinery  was  promoted  from  that  of  a  ‘general  directorate’  to  that  of  an
‘undersecretariat.’  This  move  allowed  the  controversies  prevalent  since  the  1980s
regarding Diyanet’s legal status to subside (Gözaydın 2009)5 and provided a legal basis for
its international activities (Öztürk & Sözeri 2018). These changes allowed Diyanet to move
its  services  and  activities  outside  the  mosque.  The  scope  of  Diyanet’s  institutional
responsibilities was expanded and the financial status of its staff was improved. In the
same period Diyanet TV and Radio were launched and they started broadcasting to a wide
range of audiences in society. Diyanet spiritual and ethical guidance activities started to
encompass not only religious matters, but a wide range of other issues as well, and they
expanded from health institutions to prisons, from youth detention centres to seniors’
residences. Family has become one of the key areas of interest in these activities. 
During the AKP era, Diyanet has been redesigned to provide a link between the state,
community, family and market according to neoliberal, conservative and authoritarian
needs. Moreover, the AKP discourse has tactfully changed. The balance of power between
imposed secularism on the  one  hand and the  demands  of  grassroots  democrats  and
conservatives on the other – that  balance had an impact  on AKP’s  own approach to
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Diyanet  as  an institution.  Thus for example,  in a  statement made in 2006,  the then-
president of  the TGNA (Turkish Great  National  Assembly – Parliament),  Bülent Arınç
expressed the opinion that in a secular country an institution like Diyanet should not
exist  and  religious  services  should  be  provided  by  non-state  foundations  (Arınç
5/5/2006). In 2012, however, the same Arınç, who, at that time was serving as Deputy
Prime Minister and cabinet spokesperson, made a statement emphasizing the importance
of Diyanet services and promising to promote Diyanet’s position in the State protocol. In
his statement Arınç even referred appreciatively to the early republican era of Atatürk’s
presidency – a period which often used to be criticized by the AKP for its homogenizing
and centralizing tendencies (Yeniçağ 10/7/2012). In the months following this statement,
Diyanet’s  rank in the state protocol  was promoted from 51st,  to 10th.  After assuming
office, the Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu linked Diyanet directly to the office of Prime
Ministry (Hürriyet 1/9/2014). The shift in AKP’s approach to Diyanet as a state institution
reveals how the party decided to instrumentalize the institution to instil the new national
values and neoliberal policies. 
 
The Presidents of Diyanet: From seeming autonomy to
apparent subservience
During the AKP era, the Presidents of the Diyanet played prominent and active social and
political roles. Diyanet employees of this period also assumed more active roles than their
predecessors in previous periods. The institution’s approach to national religion, namely
the secular,  Muslim,  Turkish  identity  was  determined  by  the  presidents’  respective
activities  regarding  faith,  the  respective  distances  they  kept  to  politics  and  the
statements they made during changing political circumstances.
The first President appointed during the AKP period, who came to power in 2003, was
Prof. Dr. Ali Bardakoğlu. In his period a lot of work was done regarding the training of
Diyanet staff, academic studies and overseas appointments (Gibbon 2008). Moreover, the
number of female employees, and the range of activities targeting women and the family,
increased (Tütüncü 2010; Maritato 2017). In this respect, Bardakoğlu gave the impression
of being a more active president than his predecessors. In a speech, Bardakoğlu describes
the functions that Diyanet performed in the republican era as follows:
First  Period:  1924-1965,  in  this  period  Diyanet  only  performed  administrative
duties.  In the second period from 1965 to 1982,  Diyanet’s main function was to
enlighten the public in religious matters.  In the third period covering the years
1982 –  2004 Diyanet’s main task to provide for  social  solidarity  and integration
(Yavuzer 2005: 61). 
In  another  speech,  Bardakoğlu  talks  about  Diyanet’s  mission  of  reaching  out  to  the
different layers of society:
The purpose of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is over and above of all
forms  of  political  opinion  and  thought,  is  to  provide  for  national  unity  and
solidarity,  to  promote  the  supreme  principles  of  our  religion  including
brotherhood, mutual help, and self-sacrifice, to enlighten our people in religious
matters, and to commit them to ethical values (Ibid.). 
Even  though  Diyanet  experienced  one  of  its  strongest  periods  during  Bardakoğlu’s
presidency, as the above statements show, he sought to keep Diyanet’s distance from
politics  and saw its  primary mission as  that  of  enlightening the society on religious
matters.  In  fact,  one  of  the  reasons  why  Bardakoğlu’s  presidency  was  not  extended
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another term was the distance he kept to politics. For example, when Erdoğan publicly
suggested to “solve Turkey’s headscarf problem” by asking Diyanet’s opinion about the
issue, Bardakoğlu replied:
Diyanet does not issue opinions on demand. Our opinion is known: Headscarf is a
religious requirement, but it is not a prerequisite of religion. The issue must be
solved politically. Defining the boundaries of individual freedoms is the job of the
Parliament.  If  secularism  is  juxtaposed  with  the  headscarf,  harm  may  come  to
secularism (Habertürk 11/11/2010).
The ban on headscarves had been imposed by the National Security Council in 1984, four
years  after  the 1980 coup.  It  had a tremendous impact  on life-plans of  a  number of
headscarfed women, who were deprived of their education or jobs because of the ban
(Akbulut 2008; Şişman 2009; Korteweg & Yurdakul 2014). It also polarized the society by
juxtaposing secular Muslim women who were not wearing headscarves against religious
Muslim women who were wearing it and provided the AKP with a much-needed story of
victimization,  which  it  skilfully  used  to  pursue  its  political  agenda  (Mutluer  2016a).
Societal polarization on the issue was so clear-cut, that different camps even used two
different  terms to signify religious covering of  women.  The believers  and those who
defended  the  wearing  of  the  headscarf  as  a  matter  of  individual  freedom  called  it
başörtüsü  –  literally  headscarf  –,  while  those  who positioned themselves  as  Kemalist,
secular Muslims used to call it türban. It was in this tense context of societal and political
polarization, that Erdoğan sought to pull Diyanet right into the controversy by seeking its
opinion on the matter. But Bardakoğlu resisted that attempt with the above quoted reply.
This incidence was not only a good example of the distance that Bardakoğlu kept to
politics, but it also was the first sign of the leave that Erdoğan took from his original
campaign promise of protecting secularism. After Bardakoğlu, Mehmet Görmez, who was
the vice president during Bardakoğlu’s term, became the second president of Diyanet
appointed by the AKP in November 2010. 
What  distinguished Mehmet Görmez from his  predecessor  was  his  willingness  to  get
involved in current affairs and to take a political stance in certain issue areas. Yet he too
emphasized that religion and politics should be separated from one another and took
concrete steps toward making Diyanet a more autonomous institution – a demand which
had also been expressed by his predecessor, Ali Bardakoğlu. Subsequently, during the
period of  Görmez’s  presidency,  Alevi  and Kurdish problems were high on the public
agenda and he engaged in political activities and made statements regarding these issues.
Even though in these statements Diyanet recognized the Alevi and Kurdish problems as
problems and sought to propose solutions, which was a first in its history, changes in the
political circumstances also led to contradictory political statements and practices. We
shall return to these contradictions in greater detail below, as they are significant in
showing how Görmez’s approach to national religion has changed over time. 
Perhaps the best examples of political statements made by Görmez can be found in the
aftermath of the corruption scandals of 17-25 December 2013 which claimed the posts of
four  cabinet  ministers  and  which  were  instigated  by  AKP’s  former  ally,  the  Gülen
Movement.6 
After this event, the alliance between the Gülen Movement and AKP collapsed irrevocably
(Watmough & Öztürk 2018), and especially after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, for which
the AKP accused the Gülen movement, Turkey added another axis to its repertoire of
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societal  polarizations,  which  was  already  heavily  populated  by  Turkish/Kurdish  and
Sunni/Alevi juxtapositions. 
Even though Görmez did not explicitly name any specific communities, it was obvious
that  a  statement  he  made  after  the  corruption  scandals  was  pointing  to  the  Gülen
movement. Emphasizing that religious structures and services should remain within the
confines of religion and morality, Görmez said “of course stealing is bad. But stealing the
nationʼs spirituality is bad too” (Haber7 11/9/2014) .Yet despite this statement, he was
accused by some AKP supporters of being affiliated with the Gülen Movement (KPSScafe
3/8/2017). 
During Görmez’s presidency, Diyanet became a showcase in and through which the AKP
exhibited its power in all its neoliberal glory. The best example of this is the controversy
about the Diyanet President’s official car. Erdoğan himself ordered a very expensive car
to be bought for the President of the Diyanet to demonstrate the high esteem in which
the  institution  was  held.  When  this  move  was  criticized  by  the  opposition  parties,
including the Peoples’ Democracy Party, as a waste of public money, Görmez decided to
return the car, and using the occasion of Baraʻa Night7, made a statement inviting the
believers to “foreswear the occasions in which we forget about truthfulness, morals and
virtue,  and go instead for  hypocrisy and vanity” (Cumhuriyet 1/6/2015).  But  Erdoğan
publicly admonished Görmez for his decision to return the car, and presented him with
an armoured Mercedes which he ordered Görmez to use in his official capacity. This was
one of the peaks of neoliberal symbolism – a form of vanity that marks the Erdoğan Era
(Gök 22/11/2015).
Görmez not only failed in keeping the Diyanet away from politics as much as he liked, but
he also failed in preventing Erdoğan from politicizing the institution even more. The net
result of these tensions was Görmez’s early retirement. In September 2017, Ali Erbaş was
appointed as the new president of Diyanet. 
The first speech that Erbaş made after assuming office was unapologetically political. He
referred  to  the  Gülen  movement  as  FETO  –  an  acronym  for  Fethullahist  Terror
Organization, which was starting to be used by the government particularly after the
coup attempt of 15 June 2016. To emphasize the significance he attributed to Islamic
Unity, Erbaş also used the Islamic concept of ummah8 and talked about “the revival of
Ummah” to get his political message through in no uncertain terms. The exact wording of
the relevant passage from his statement is as follows: 
Our institution is the hope of all those who pray for the damage that FETO caused
by  exploiting  young  brains  with  a  mysterious  and  obscure  understanding  of
religion to be repaired and the legacy of our martyrs to be honoured. In order to
reclaim the confused minds and provide for the revival of the Ummah, we need to
work harder than ever before (Cumhuriyet 18/9/2017).
Under close examination, out of these three presidents of the AKP era, Bardakoğlu stands
out for his success in keeping the institution relatively distant from politics. While during
Bardakoğlu’s  presidency  Diyanet followed  a  relatively  independent  course,  and  even
resisted AKP’s and Erdoğan’s passes at it to use it for political advantage, the institution’s
involvement in politics increased with each of Bardakoğlu’s successors and this increase
ran a parallel course to the increases in AKP’s votes in successive elections. As AKP’s
political support base expanded, its tendency to centralize political power became more
pronounced and Diyanet turned increasingly into an instrument which Erdoğan and the
AKP used as a neoliberal showcase representing the power of Islamic neoliberalism and to
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transmit and instil  the new values of the so-called “new Turkey” to the society. This
change  is  best  reflected  in the  ambivalent  position  of  Diyanet on  Kurdish  and  Alevi
questions, particularly during Görmez’s presidency. 
 
Militarism and Martyrdom: From Nation to Ummah
Another issue area where the continuities in the state’s approach to Diyanet, as well as the
new policies introduced by the AKP, can be examined revolves around militarism and
martyrdom.
Thinking  that  the  relationships  between  politics  on  the  one  hand  and  religion  and
military on the other might be likely to cause problems in the future (Kara 2004: 181), the
founding  elites  of  the  Republic  designed  Diyanet and  the  Turkish  Armed  Forces  as
institutions charged with the task of protecting Kemalizm, secularism and the Republic.
This way it was possible not only to instil the Turkish national values in all male citizens
through  the  compulsory  military  service,  but  also  to  encourage  everyone,  including
women,  children  and  the  elderly,  to  participate  in  the  militaristic  spirit  of  Turkish
nationalism (Cizre 2001). 
Since  its  foundation,  Diyanet performed  this  function  particularly  well  through  its
sermons,  publications  and public  statements  which “assimilated religious  holiness  in
nationalism” (Altınay & Bora 2002: 147). National Unity was built and presented through a
symbolism  which  differentiated  itself  from  other  Muslim  Communities  as  somehow
superior.  When  the  history  of  the  Turkish  nation  was  re-written,  the  points  of
intersection with the Islamic history were deliberately exalted. In other words, in order
for  the Turkish identity  to  appear  stronger,  Islamic  elements  were added to it.  This
resulted in the creation of a type of “National Ummah” which was somehow separate from
the  Muslim  Ummah  (Saçmalı  2013:  26).  Diyanet was  presented  not  only  as  the
representative of the only true version of Islam, but it also served to provide religious
legitimacy to the Turkish state whenever it was needed. This allowed the state to present
its policies of secularization and nationalization as religiously justified.
Even though Islamic activities have been restricted after the 12 September 1980 coup,
these restrictions were not fully extended to Diyanet. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the ban
on headscarves, which cost many women their education and jobs, was imposed in this
period. In the so-called post-modern coup of 28 February 1997, the government reacted
even harsher. The governing coalition partners of the period, the leader of the political
Islamicist Prosperity Party, Necmettin Erbakan and the leader of the True Path Party,
Tansu Çiller  were forced to resign. During that  period the National  Security  Council
started to control Diyanet’s sermons, and Diyanet’s publications were observed to adopt a
militaristic and nationalist language that was tailor made to counter a possible Islamic
threat. In fact, the election of the AKP to power in 2002 can be seen as a reaction against
the persecution and exclusion to which the 28 February coup subjected the Islamicists
(Yılmaz 2004: 615).
The AKP was a political party which was established by politicians coming from the Milli
Görüş (National Outlook) tradition and Diyanet’s instrumental role continued in this new
period as well. Islamic activities which had been weakened during the 28 February period
and the restrictions and budget cuts that had been imposed on Diyanet were lifted. It was
in this period that nationalism and Islam were brought even closer to one another. In
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2012 the then-prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan charged the institution with the
upbringing of a religious generation (Diken 27/2/2016). In the many speeches he made,
Erdoğan  introduced  a  “yeni (new)  milli”  conception  of  the  Turkish  nation  as  “yerli
(homegrown) ve milli (national)” which encompassed only Muslim communities. In this
context  Islam was  positioned as  the  basic  commonalty  that  defined this  nation as  a
nation. While the phrase “National Will” [milli irade] gained more and more prominence
in the discourse of the governing party and its leader, the notion of Turkishness has been
gradually deemphasized. And the Diyanet’s muftis, following Erdoğan’s advice, started to
use the term milletimiz (our nation)  or  milli  (the nation)  instead of  “Turkish Nation”
(Saçmalı 2013). The fact that the present president Ali Erbaş used the term ummah in his
inaugural speech appears to be in line with this approach (Cumhuriyet 18/9/2017). 
Even though changes in political circumstances lead to shifts in the symbolic emphasis
put on concepts like Turkish, nation or ummah, the importance attributed to the concept
of martyrdom never changed. And Diyanet made regular statements designed to present
both compulsory military service and death as a martyr as normal phenomena. It never
missed  a  commemoration  when  doing  so  helped  to  normalize  military  service  or
martyrdom. The best examples of this are the sermons issued for the commemoration of
Dardanelles Campaign of 1915-16. The frequent themes that come up in these sermons
are:  the loftiness  of  military service,  the virtue of  defending the homeland,  and the
happiness of reaching the rank of a martyr. Thus, for example, in one of the sermons
dated February 1990, martyrdom is identified with the survival of the nation, and exalted
as such. 
Our nation is so familiar and enamoured with the ranks of martyrdom and that of a
war veteran, without them it is not possible to think of this nation, the life of this
nation, or the history of this nation. In the ‘Allah Allah’ cries of the soldiers in the
wars, in the hopeless love that makes death appear to them as a reunion with their
maker,  in  the smell  of  the  heaven  they  inhale,  there  is  always  a  desire  for
martyrdom. Nations which lack this desire are destined, sooner or later, to bow to
the wind of history and to disappear.9 
The same theme has been covered every year more than once. But particularly in the
1990s when the armed conflict with the Kurdistan Workersʼ Party [PKK – Partiya Karkerên
Kurdistan]  reached  its  peak,  the  emphasis  put  on  “martyrdom”  carried  a  different
meaning. These sermons sought to motivate as much the general public as the soldiers
protecting  the  borders  of  the  nation-state  and  they  reproduced  the  importance  of
martyrdom in defending the homeland over and over again.10 This approach of the 1990s
has also been taken over by the AKP, particularly in times when the conflicts intensified
and it will be further discussed below, under the heading of the Kurdish Issue. 
The AKP also use the theme of martyrdom to forestall public outcry in cases of industrial
work accidents. Thus, for example in relation to the case of the Soma Coal Mine, which
was run by a private company under the auspices of a publicly owned enterprise, Turkish
Coal Mining Enterprises [TKİ – Türkiye Kömür İşletmeleri] and where 301 miners died as a
result of a mining accident due the lack of appropriate safety measures in May 2014 (Diken
14/5/2014, 16/8/2016), Görmez made the following statement emphasizing martyrdom: 
God’s endless mercy be unto our brothers who lost their lives. They rest in peace.
God give them the rank of martyrdom! (...) When the believers come face to face
with a calamity, they say ‘we belong to god and shall return to him...’ They teach us
how blessed it is to pursue an honest penny, the proceeds of oneʼs own labour. They
are  now  the  quests  of  our  God.  They  are  now  the  neighbours  of  our  beloved
Prophet.11 
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Even though Görmez called for an effective investigation into the circumstances of the
accident to identify and punish those who were responsible, the fact that the workers
who lost  their  lives have been referred to as martyrs,  can be seen as an attempt to
normalize workplace murders, and as such it is one of the clearest examples that, in the
AKP era,  the theme of  martyrdom is  used for neoliberal  purposes as well.  After this
speech, Diyanet’s Muftis have organized a number of events under the title of “Soma
Martyrs.”12 Thus,  in the AKP era,  both militarism and milli –national  –  became more
Islamic,  and  martyrdom  more  neoliberal  connotations.  Diyanet is  one  of  the  main
institutions that reflects both shifts. 
 
The Kurdish Question: From religious inclusion to
nationalistic exclusion
Diyanet’s approach to the Kurdish issue has followed state policies since its foundation.
Thus, this has led Diyanet to have contradictory approaches to the Kurdish issue in line
with the shifting policies of the AKP. 
During the whole Republican history,  Diyanet’s approach to Kurdish identity and the
Kurdish problem has been in line with the official political approach of the respective
period. During the foundation of the Republic all ethnic identities but the Turkish one
were disregarded, Kurds were assimilated into the Turkish nation (Yeğen 2002) and this
was reflected in Diyanet’s policies and discourses about the existence of Kurds. 
Yet,  particularly  in the 1980s,  Kurdish demands for the recognition of their  identity
became more pronounced. The Kurdish movement has become active in Turkish politics;
however, there have been intermittent periods of armed conflict with the PKK, which is a
militaristic  organization.  These  conflicts  reached  their  peak  in  the  1990s  when  the
militarization of pro-state Kurds, who sided and co-operated with the Turkish state, and
forced  evacuations  of  the  “pro-Kurdish”  villages,  became  commonplace  occurrences
(Kurban et al. 2007). 
Accordingly, the sermons published by the Diyanet in the 1990s revolved around such
themes  as  patriotism  and  the  importance  of  the  defence  of  the  homeland,  Turkish
civilization and the blessedness of military service. The theme of martyrdom, which was
mentioned above, was used to condemn the activities of the PKK. The presumed virtues
and inherent characteristics of the Turkish nation were praised.13 
Diyanet adopted this approach in the AKP era as well and particularly in the sermons and
official statements published and issued during periods of intense armed conflict,  the
theme of  martyrdom returned.14 In  the  context  of  public  debate  on  the  question of
conscientious objection (to compulsory military) service in 2012, it issued a statement to
the effect that “conscientious objection is unacceptable from a religious point of view”,
something which was criticized heavily by anti-militaristic circles and theologians alike (
Milli Gazete 20/4/2012). 
In the AKP period the steps that Diyanet took on the questions of Kurdish identity and
language were influenced by the prevailing political conjuncture and its contradictions at
that particular time. Thus, for example within the context of public debate about the
possibility of giving sermons in the Kurdish language, Ali Bardakoğlu declared that they
could  comply  with  such  a  wish,  if  there  was  a  demand  for  it  (CNNTürk 3/9/2009).
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However, some commentators list this issue as one of the areas of contention between Ali
Bardakoğlu and the government (Türenç 13/11/2010).
Under Görmez’s Presidency, Diyanet appointed 1000 meles who received their theological
training in local medreses, to such Kurdish-majority cities as Diyarbakır, Urfa and Mardin.
Mele means imam in Kurdish, and this was a move in line with the government’s then-
prevalent policy of peace talks with the Kurds (Radikal 21/6/2012). The same period also
witnessed  a  proliferation  of  sermons  emphasizing  the  importance  of  peace  among
Muslims.  At  the  same  time  however,  when  the  preparations  for  the  publication  of
sermons in Kurdish, Arabic and Zaza languages were well underway (Başaran 26/3/2012),
the Islamic Encyclopædia was published by Diyanet in February 2014. The Encyclopædia
extensively covered the distinctive cultures and languages of the Turks and Arabs in 44
volumes, but it did not mention the Kurds and the Kurdish language even once – a fact
which received widespread criticism for its blatant disregard of the Kurdish identity.
Amidst these criticisms the TGNA accepted the so-called democratization legislation on
the Kurdish issue, and the first sermon in Kurdish language was given on 8 March 2014, in
Cizre, Şırnak. 
The ambivalences in the position of Diyanet on the Kurdish question resurfaced four
years later, in January 2018, when Turkey started a military operation in the northern
Syrian enclave Afrin. The majority of the population in Afrin is Kurdish and it was then
under the control of the de facto administration of the Kurdish dominated Democratic
Union Party  (PYD)  and its  armed branch People’s  Protection Units  (YPG),  which the
Turkish  government  accused  of  being  linked  with  the  PKK.  The  newly  appointed
president of Diyanet, Ali Erbaş issued a statement in support of the operation in which he
weaved the themes of ummah and martyrdom into one single thread. In an atmosphere
where any criticism of the operation was effectively suppressed by the government in the
domestic  media  while  reports  of  unlawful  killings  and  displacement  of  the  civilian
population in the Afrin region were frequent in the international media, Erbaş said that
the  reason  why  the  military  operation  of  the  Turkish  forces  and  their  allies  was
progressing  slowly  was  because  the  Turkish  military  and  its  non-state  allies  “were
fighting according to Islamic moral principles and were acting sensitively to protect the
lives of the civilians.” Erbaş sought to buttress his argument by giving the non-Muslim
American soldiers, who, he claimed, killed 1 million innocent people, as a contrasting
example. This was a clear sign that, in the AKP era, Diyanet used the discourse of the
“unity  of  Muslisms”  as  a  political  tool  even  when  making  a  militaristic  statement
supporting  a  cross-border  operation  by  the  national  army  of  the  Turkish  state  (
Cumhuriyet 10/2/2018).
 
The Alevi Question: Inside and/or Outside Diyanet
The Alevi Question is a further issue area in which Diyanet’s and its presidents’ discourses
reflect  the  shifting  policies  of  the  AKP.  During  the  foundation  of  the  Republic,  the
founding elites regarded Alevis as an intrinsic part of the Turkish-Muslim identity and
therefore they did not provide a specific framework designed to allow them to exercise
their  freedoms of  belief  and conscience.  Keeping Sunni  Islam under  control  through
secularism, the state did not need any other belief system (Küçük 2002: 902; Mutluer
2015). Quite to the contrary, in the early Republican Era, Alevism was one of the excluded
others  of  the  republican  identity  (Yeğen  2002).  The  controversy  over  Alevis
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representation in Diyanet came to the public agenda in the 1980s, but according to Ismail
Kara  its  roots  go  back  to  the  1920s,  and  in  effect,  to  the  very  first  attempts  at
transitioning  to  multi-party  politics  in  the  early  republican  era  (Kara  2004:  194).
According to Kara,  the public  debate about  the Alevis  in the 2000s was set  within a
framework of democracy, democratization and freedoms, because the Alevis experienced
a number of massacres in the republican era which were provoked by state agents and yet
the culprits have never been held accountable for their actions. In fact, until the 2000s
most Alevis  refrained from using the word “Alevi” openly in public (Massicard 2005;
Mutluer 2016) and this resulted in the normalization of social discrimination against the
Alevis.15
During his presidency Bardakoğlu objected to the prejudices in relation to Alevis. Thus,
for example, being reminded that some Alevis do not observe such religious practices as
fasting, praying and the ban on alcohol as a part of their faith, Bardakoğlu made the
following statement:
Life is  wider than prayer,  alcohol  and fasting.  We wrote history together.  If  we
restrict the points of agreement to these three, it would mean that there is no other
commonality in the family. We cannot reduce religiousness or the Muslim identity
to  these  three  points...  This  must  be  the  principle:  Those  who  observe  [these
practices], observe, those who don’t, don’t. We need to create an environment of
freedom without obstructing each other, or forcing each other (İnsel 23/10/2010). 
Görmez, for his part, visited the Erikli Baba Cultural Association, an Alevi organization, in
2011,  saying  “I  came here  to  eat  lokma  with cans.  This  is  a  courtesy  visit”  (Haberler
27/5/2011). Can and lokma are culturally loaded words associated with the Alevi traditions
(the first refers to human beings as souls, the latter refers to a very modest meal) and the
fact that Görmez chose to use those words in explaining the reason of his visit, was a clear
message of goodwill. Similarly, in 2012, in a TV program he participated in, Görmez said
that: 
Alevism is a sui generis path which was born from within the tradition of Islamic
wisdom. This path too has its own ways of entreaty, its own methods, and its own
places where these are practiced. There should be no legal constraints to construct
cemevis. They should be freely constructed (T24 13/10/2012). 
Again, in 2012 when Alevi houses were branded, supposedly for the purpose of identifying
and attacking Alevis,  Görmez said: “If necessary I will  personally wait in front of the
houses that have been branded” (Şahin & Işık 1/8/2012) and spoke positively about the
religious practices of the Alevis.
These positive statements about Alevis coincided with the governmental policy of the
time, the so-called “opening to the Alevis,” when a series of workshops were organized
with the participation of Alevi organizations. Even though these workshops started in a
very promising way which allowed different Alevi groups to voice their common demands
clearly, because of two changes in the political conjuncture, they failed to produce any
concrete  policy  outcomes  (Mutluer  2016b).  The  first  change  in  question  was  Kemal
Kılıçdaroğlu’s election as the leader of the main opposition party, CHP. Kılıçdaroğlu is an
Alevi, and with his election as the leader of the opposition, Alevi votes lost the attraction
they had for Erdoğan and the AKP. The other change was the outbreak of the Syrian war
in which the Erdoğan government positioned itself squarely against the Bashar al-Assad
regime, who was himself a Nusayri – an Arab Alevi. These two developments resulted in a
U-turn in the AKP’s policy of “opening to Alevis” and this U-turn, in turn, was reflected in
Diyanet’s statements.
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For example, Diyanet was very complimentary about the Alevis when the government
pursued a  policy  of  openness,  however  refused  the  request  of  an  Alevi  inmate  in  a
maximum security prison to talk with an Alevi dede (a spiritual-religious counsellor in
Alevism), instead of a Sunni imam, to take faith-oriented guidance, on the grounds that
Alevism is not a separate religion (Öztürk 17/7/2012; Söylemez 5/2/2016). Even though
this statement sounds like it was directed against Alevism as a faith, the real issue was
that Alevi dedes had not, and still do not have, legal standing under the constitution. 
Similarly, in an interview with Al Jazeera on 7 July 2014 Görmez insinuated that cemevis
(Alevi houses of prayer) are not real houses of worship:
We do not define; we try to understand. Cemevi is cemevi. As a scholar I know it as a
place where entreatment is made, where Allah’s name is mentioned – like a Mevlevi
or Bektaşi lodge. We cannot see them as houses of worship of a different religion,
houses of worship equal to mosques. It is a product of the efforts to present Alevism
as if it were a different religion. Alevism has a history of 1,000 years. We cannot
disregard this history and make new definitions (Bulut 7/7/2014). 
The last president of the AKP era, Ali Erbaş’s position on this question is also in line with
Görmez’s final approach. By saying that “Mosques are for both Sunnis and Alevis to pray
in,” Erbaş made it clear that he does not approve of cemevis to be officially recognized as
houses  of  worship and Alevi  communities  criticized him because  of  this  statement  (
Cumhuriyet 12/3/2018).
 
Gender Relations: From woman to family 
Gender relations in general, and how women are positioned in the society in particular,
are one of the important projects of both the founding elites of the Republic and the AKP.
The ideal republican woman was a protector and symbol of modern, secular, Turkish and
Islamic values, western-looking, well-educated to raise her children, caring of her family
and ready to sacrifice herself for the good of the society if needed (Berktay 1998; Sancar
2014;  Mutluer  2016a).  And  Diyanet was  charged  with  the  task  of  handling  the
responsibilities of the woman who was seen as servant and protector of the family in the
private sphere.16 But until the AKP period the presence of women in the Diyanet was
minimal. 
In  the  AKP  period,  particularly  under  the  presidency  of  Ali  Bardakoğlu,  the  active
presence  of  women  in  the  Diyanet and  services  targeting  women  have  increased
considerably (Hassan 2011). Pointing out that half of the population consists of women;
Bardakoğlu declared that they were practicing positive discrimination in the recruitment
of female staff and preachers (Milliyet 30/8/2008). The same period also witnessed women
becoming  regular  contributors  to  feminist  literature  and  graduates  of  theological
faculties were employed by Diyanet in gender equality projects (Tütüncü 2010). The so-
called Family Offices (Aile Büroları) established during the presidency of Bardakoğlu in
2003, were restructured as Family and Guidance Offices (Aile ve İrşat Rehberlik Büroları) in
2007 and, targeting women, they started to work in the general area of family-religion-
society relations. The derelict women’s sections in the mosques were renovated and with
such  activities  as  morning  prayers  and  religious  conversations,  mosques  were
transformed into places where women can come for purposes other than praying. 
Even though there  was  an  official  ban  on headscarves  in  state-affiliated  institutions
starting in the 1980s, Bardakoğlu let the female staff of Diyanet decide in either direction.
Diyanet’s Role in Building the ’Yeni (New) Milli’ in the AKP Era
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 27 | 2018
13
Still,  as  mentioned  above,  he  refrained  from making  a  public  statement  to  support
Erdoğan on this issue, which cost him his presidency. 
Particularly after 2011, AKP government policies regarding women were developed in
relation to the family. Despite criticisms by the women’s movement, the AKP government
changed the name of the State Ministry responsible for Women and the Family, to the
Ministry of Family and Social Policies and shifted its focus from women to the family. The
president of Diyanet at the time, Mehmet Görmez, followed suit and signed a cooperation
protocol with that ministry. The aim of the protocol was to protect the values of the
Turkish family, to strengthen the family and to work on social service projects.17 As such,
this protocol reflected the fact that Diyanet was charged with promoting a new version of
family values  which was based on Islamic,  and not  secular, republican motifs  of  the
foundation era. 
This agreement with the Ministry of Family and Social Policy also shaped the gender
relations in society. Even though the number of women preachers employed by Diyanet
increased from 453 in 2013 to 726 in 2014,18 the feminist, anti-discriminatory approach
that gained prominence during Bardakoğlu’s presidency somehow fell from grace during
Görmez’s  presidency.  For  example,  even though women preachers  talked about  such
topics as violence against women in their sermons, they usually made a fleeting reference
to it, leaving male perpetration eminently underemphasized. In general, Diyanet basically
approached gender and women issues by following the government’s lead and issuing
public  statements  supporting  the  government’s  position19 on  topics  such  as  the
protection of family, work life of women, how children should be raised, the future of
youth, marriage, divorce, domestic violence and violence against women.20 Moreover the
women preachers of Diyanet reached out to women, not only through their sermons in
the mosques, but through their various guidance activities outside in their everyday lives
as well (Maritato 2017).
In the AKP era,  reproductive health and abortion have become politically hot issues.
Erdoğan made it clear that he wants a ban on abortion and he received criticism from
secular and religious segments of the society alike. Erdoğan’s musings did not result in a
change of  the applicable laws,  but  the state hospitals  effectively stopped performing
abortion (MorÇatı 3/2/2015; Karaca 3/5/2013). 
In  this  period  Görmez  made  statements  supporting  AKP’s  position.  Diyanet’s  official
position on the question of abortion, as stated in the Religious Questions and Answers
Section of their website, is that it is not “appropriate from a religious point of view.”21 In
addition, Diyanet also declared that in-vitro fertilization methods are “appropriate from
a religious point of view,” provided they do not lead to a suspicion of adultery between
the married couples. This view was in line with the prevailing laws of the period banning
in-vitro fertilization for unmarried women (RG-6/3/2010-27513). 
Since the 1990s, Diyanet’s views on women’s work life too have evolved with the changing
economic conditions. In the 1990s Diyanet emphasized that women should not do any
work outside the house22, today it takes the view that women should participate in work
life in equal terms:
According to Islam, as a rule, woman can work both inside and outside her house
and help her husband in providing for her family. According the circumstances, it is
also possible that the spouses change roles in the family.23 
Sexual  orientation  has  always  been  a  taboo  subject  for  the  Diyanet.  Even  during
Bardakoğlu’s presidency when a feminist approach gained prominence, Diyanet did not
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issue any statement  on the topic.  Under  a  heterosexist  state  system,  Diyanet simply
refused to accept that there can be differences in terms of sexual orientation: 
In view of the disconcerting tendency of sexual behaviour disorders getting more
pervasive in the society, the already well-known position and answer of Islam needs
to  be  stated  very  clearly.  The  presidency  of  religious  affairs  should  lead  the
education of the society about the sexual behaviour disorders which are contrary to
human nature and against the nature of the Muslims. Without offending or publicly
humiliating people, it should support initiatives which seek solve the problems in a
healthy way (Kaos GL 6/11/2009).
This statement of Diyanet has not only been criticized by the libertarian circles, but it
also created controversies within Islamic circles as well.24 
 
Conclusion 
As İştar Gözaydın says “the state makes use of the Diyanet as an administrative tool to
indoctrinate  and  propagate  official  ideology  regarding  Islam”  (2014:13).  Diyanet was
established to secure “the secular nature of the state in Turkey” (Gözaydın 2008: 1). This
approach has determined the meanings attributed to secularism and Turkishness, as well
as how these concepts are used in everyday life. During the AKP period the institution
carries  on  being  a  socio-political  tool  and  when  necessary  it  uses  the  national  and
religious in an “intertwined way”, in Brubaker’s sense (2012). Thus, with AKP’s coming to
power the meanings attributed to and the practice of the secular, the religious and the
national have changed.  In the beginning,  the self-styled conservative-democratic AKP
sought to bridge the gap between the two positions which were pitched against  one
another during the foundation period of the republic – namely the secular Turkish and
Muslim democratic positions. But particularly after 2011, the increases in AKP’s votes
encouraged it to move from a more inclusive conservative democratic position, to a more
conservative,  neoliberal  authoritarian  position.  And  AKP’s  leader,  Erdogan,  did  not
refrain from positioning the secular and the Muslim as two mutually exclusive sides of a
political  polarization.  And  Diyanet’s  role  has  changed  accordingly.  In  the  AKP  era,
Diyanet has become more powerful and more active than in any other period. Its budget
increased and its status in the state hierarchy was stepped up. It reached out to society,
and its activities were carried outside the mosques. AKP and its leader Erdogan positioned
the institution as  one of  the important  symbols  of  the political  establishment which
makes political statements and engages in politics to further AKP’s policies in such issue
areas as the Kurdish and Alevi questions or gender relations. When needed, he asks for its
view. In short, in the AKP era, the institution has become a representative of the “yeni
(new)  milli (national)”  –  “ yerli (homegrown)  ve  milli (national)”  –  identity  and  the
neoliberal  policies of the government,  and its ties to the political  centre has become
stronger than ever.
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NOTES
1. The translations of this and all the following quotations from original Turkish sources
are mine.
2. This was a continuation of Ali Fuat Başgilʼs approach, which questioned but did not
reject secularism. Başgil was one of the ideologues of the Democrat Party, which in turn,
was the political root of all centre-right currents that followed it (Başgil 1954 in Mert
2001: 2008).
3. For a detailed analysis of Diyanet’s budget at the political turning points in Turkey,
please see (Mutluer 2014: 17-32) which was prepared by an anonymous group of
economists and social scientists working in different institutions. In 1980 Diyanetʼs part
in the overall state budget was 0.60 %. 
4. In 2010 Diyanetʼs part in the overall state budget was 1 % and it has increased since
then. For detailed analysis of Diyanet’s budget at the political turning points in Turkey,
please see Mutluer (2014).
5. The Statute no 6002, of 1 July 2010 amending The Statute Regarding the Establishment
and Duties of the Presidency of Religious Affairs and Some Other Statutes.
6. The Gülen movement is also called the Gülen cemaati, cemaat or, particularly after the
AKP parted company with them, as FETÖ [Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü – the Fethullahist
Terror Organization]. 
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7. A religious night two weeks before Ramadan starts, when Muslims seek for forgiveness
and pray to God for that. 
8. Ummah refers to the religious community of all Muslims. 
9. “Gazilik ve Şehitlik” (Veteranship and Martyrdom), Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Hutbe
Arşivi (The Presidency of Religious Affairs Sermon Archive – 02.02.1990). 
10. For different examples look “Askerlik ve İslam” (Military and Islam), Diyanet İşleri
Başkanlığı Hutbe Arşivi (The Presidency of Religious Affairs Sermon Archive –
06.09.1996). 
11. “Müminler Tek Vücut Gibidir” (Believers are One), Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Hutbe
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ABSTRACTS
This study argues that Diyanet has become one of  the most important political  symbols and
representatives of the “yeni milli” (new national) – or as named by AKP members, “yerli ve milli”
(homegrown and national) – values and neoliberal economic policies that the AKP seeks to instil
and implement.  Adopting feminist  discourse analysis  (with a reflexive approach),  this  article
examines the continuities  and novelties  that  Diyanet,  as  an institution which has assumed a
major function since its foundation in creating the national-religion connection of the Turkish
Republic,  namely  the  secular  -laik-  Muslim  Turkish  national  identity,  underwent  in  the
neoliberal AKP [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party] period. This study first
discusses the institutional structure of Diyanet during the AKP era, and then analyses the policies
and public statements of Diyanet,  government and non-governmental actors in the following
issue areas: Diyanet’s presidents during the AKP era, nationalism-militarism, Kurdish, Alevi and
gender questions.
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